THE purpose of this paper is to investigate the meaning of practical success as a criterion of truth – when practical success is interpreted in terms of voluntary achievement.

To our argument one proposition is fundamental: the success of conduct is measured by the degree to which it attains its end. The truth of this statement will scarcely be disputed; it is so obvious as to seem self-evident. Yet its neglect has led to de- plorable errors-among them the attempt to biologize episte- mology. Hence it is worth-while at the outset to recite certain elementary principles. Human conduct has its source in intelligent volition. Voluntary action is action in pursuit of a con- sciously chosen end. It succeeds in so far as it realizes this end. Thus if definite meaning is to be imparted to practical success as a criterion of truth, it must be illuminated by the discovery of the one end whose attainment, as a whole or in part, makes con- duct successful. It will not answer to cite the particular aims of different individuals, as success in their attainment affords no universal standard of truth, but would mark as true any idea that assisted any individual in fulfilling his desire. Nor will biological conceptions, such as adjustment to environment, help us here. The end required to satisfy volition can be discovered only by finding out what are the demands of volition, and these can be learned only by a study of the activity itself. The help of psychology in making a functional analysis of voluntary action, and of ethics in making a critical estimate of the value of different ends, are needed to solve the epistemological problem.

Fortunately, students of psychology and ethics are generally agreed in regarding volition as an organizing activity, which works to increase the unity of intelligent life. This, the essential nature of will, is manifested in all its different forms: in simple desire, which unites the succeeding movements of the agent as means to the attainment of an end which is itself an expression of his growing experience; in purpose, where the successive desires are themselves subordinated to a comprehensive life- interest; in the social and religious ideals, which include and harmonize the interests of many individuals. It is then safe to assert that volition is essentially an organizing agency. Its end can therefore be nothing less than progressive self -organization- the expansion of the personal life of humanity. Of course this end is sought under the actual conditions of human existence; it is attained by means of the objects and agencies given in human experience. Thus-under existing conditions-man achieves self-organization through such mastery of his own bodily mechanism as enables him to fulfill his present need, such control of the forces of nature as enables him to provide for his future security, such use of his social and religious resources as enables him to conserve his permanent welfare. Since through the pursuit of this progression of ends volition achieves its aim of self-organization, any thought which contributes to their attainment will deserve to be regarded as practically successful and hence true.

Still, it must be confessed that practical success, even after such interpretation, lacks much of the precision and applicability required of a working criterion of truth and falsity in the different fields of knowledge. Further study of the agencies involved in the organizing activity of volition is necessary in order ade- quately to define our criterion and make clear the method of its application.

Let us, then, examine voluntary action with a view to distinguishing clearly the different factors whose cooperation is required in order that its work of self-organization shall proceed. Such analysis discloses the presence of three factors operating in organic interdependence. These three factors may be given the familiar names of thought, action, and feeling; but with the under- standing that they shall be defined anew in terms of the dis- tinctive function they perform in the comprehensive activity of volition.

By thought is meant the power of ideating objects regarded as possible of realization. The qualities ascribed to the objects proposed as ends are derived from past experience, although the combination or synthesis of these qualities may be new and original. Hence such objects of thought, when as ends of action they are realized, stand in relation to objects already realized by the agent, and serve to connect all intermediating objects with his previous experience. Thus the self, in this activity of ideation, as it were projects its own unity forward over new and unexplored fields. Action, the second of the factors mentioned, is the power of realizing ideal objects through the adaptation of actual conditions and agencies. The instrumentalities employed are actual in the sense that they are not wholly in the control of the agent, but are, in their order and relation, inde- pendent of his volition. Action must take its departure from objects already realized and thus brought under control of the agent, and then go forward to utilize existing conditions, overcoming their independence and converting them into stepping-stones by which it advances towards its end. Since the instrumentalities which it employs are originally outside its control, the working of action involves in a special way effort-for the agent must be constantly wary, eager to seize every advantage the situation offers, in pressing forward to his goal. This goal is reached when actual existence is brought into agreement with ideal end-this agreement being established by the fact that the object becomes a permanent basis and existing point of departure for further action in pursuit of other ends. Thus action contributes to the process of self-organization by actually incorporating new objects into the unity of self-consciousness. The effect of such achieve- ment on the state of the self is reflected in the third factor necessary to the work of volition, feeling. Feeling is the power of appreciating the degree of unity realized by the conscious self. When through thought an object is conceived as an end of action, this end, because ideal, conflicts with the actual condition of the self and destroys its unity by introducing into it unreconciled opposition. The strain and tension which results is reflected in unpleasant feeling. When, on the other hand, through action this tension and opposition are overcome, and the ideal object is given a place in the expanding unity of personal life, the restoration and enrichment of the unity of the self which results is, in its turn, reflected in pleasant feeling. Thus, through the cooperation of thought, action, and feeling, the boundaries of personality are extended, and its content enlarged, by the acquisition of a greater number of objects, and the in- corporation of an increasing variety of interests.

While all voluntary acts that attain their end perform a work of organization, since they extend the unity of self-conscious life by introducing into it new objects, the degree to which an act of will promotes self-organization is determined by the comprehensiveness of its end, and this, in its turn, depends upon the number of other objects it makes possible of realization, the variety of additional activities for which it paves the way. Now, which ends are thus most comprehensive-which is, in fact, the most comprehensive of all-cannot be discovered by any analysis of volition, or deduced from the results of such analysis; it can be learned only from experience. We must accept as the ultimate reality, not simply the power of will, i. e., the capacity of self-organization, but also the actual conditions under which it operates.

We may notice in passing that the light which our analysis throws upon the character and office of thought in personal development justifies us in adopting practical success as the criterion of truth. Thought derives its character from the part it plays in the process of self-organization. It owes its ideality to the fact that it freely projects the unity of the self in opposition to conditions actually existent and proposes that this expanded unity be realized through action; its objectivity to the fact that in its ideation it observes the facts and relations previously realized by conduct. Since, moreover, thought exists only as a factor in volition and ideas are primarily ends of action, the test of their truth is the conduct which seeks to realize them, thus incorporating them within the real world of the agent.

We are now prepared to study somewhat more in detail the three specific activities through which the fundamental power of volition gains expression-thought, action, and feeling. The fact that demands recognition next in the sequence of our argument is that each of these partial activities, itself a function of will, becomes in the course of personal development a specialized form of the original and underlying activity, having its own characteristic ideal which is only a special expression of the one generic end of all voluntary action-progressive self-organization. We shall now consider these three activities with a view to distinguishing the particular expression given in each to the supreme end of human conduct.

I. Intellectual.-The work of thought is to represent all objects that are possible of realization as ends of action. Since the will which is the source of successive acts remains the same, these ideal objects must preserve fixed connections if they are to remain possible of realization. Hence thought is not content to leave its objects in the connections in which they first appear in experience, but is ever seeking to relate them in more intimate and less changeable ways. The aim of intellectual activity is to formulate in idea such a system of objects as shall fulfill all the needs and respond to all the activities of intelligent personality. This end, of an ideal system completely self-consistent and coherent throughout, although only partly realized, nevertheless exercises a controlling influence over all our thinking. We tend to reject as false all ideas that do not conform to, or fit in with, that objective order which we have thus far constructed by working over and systematizing in thought the facts of our experience. Contrariwise, we are inclined to accept as true all beliefs that are consistent with, or serve to extend the accepted order of ideas, thus complying with the conditions of an organized experience.

II. Technical.-Action is the power of utilizing actual conditions and converting them into means for the accomplishment of ends. Since the adjective ‘practical’ is properly applied to all voluntary activity, including that of thought and emotion as well as of action (in the narrow sense, as the word is here used), it will prevent confusion to call the activity under present consideration technical. The conditions with which our technical capacity must cope are given as actual facts; as such they are immediately experienced in their manifold and intricate connections. Among the varied connections that continually present themselves, the work of action is to seize upon, and follow up, the one that promises most speedily to bring about the intended agreement between existing conditions and ideal end. When through effort of attention and contrivance, a path is blazed out which leads speedily and certainly to the realization of an idea, the power of action has fulfilled its office; for it has placed at the disposal of the agent an instrument of self-expansion. As the servant of volition, action has for its aim the complete mastery by our common intelligence of the objects and forces of the environment through the employment of the most efficient and economical instruments in the physical, vital, and social spheres. These instruments take the form of machines and mechanical processes, methods and policies, remedies and treatments, customs, manners, and institutions. In conformity with its aim, our technical activity rejects all instruments, inventions, and adaptations, except the most efficient and economical-that is, those that guide us most speedily and expeditiously into the presence of the desired object.

III. Aesthetic.-Feeling reflects the effect upon the conscious agent himself of the pursuit and achievement of ends. When an object which has been selected for pursuit as an end is realized through action, the reestablishment of personal unity which results is appreciated in the pleasure of successful attainment. As conduct is organized through the achievement of more and more comprehensive ends the accompanying pleasures become more varied and harmonious, their harmony and consonance reflecting the proportionate expression provided for different interests in the inclusive ideal. Such appreciation of its own inner unity may itself be sought as an end by the conscious self, and is explicitly made such in aesthetic activity. The aesthetic or emotional capacity therefore aims immediately to realize the unity of personal life through feeling. To this end it seeks to induce such activities of perception and adjustment as serve by their harmonious interplay to renew in the self the pleasant sense of agreement and concord among the ‘constituent parts.

An objection must now be considered which, if not removed, will gather force as we proceed. Are not the three activities which we have distinguished-intellectual, technical, and aesthetic -all expressions of will? Must not each in consequence include, on its own account, the three moments of thought, action, and feeling? If we grant this, the situation becomes confused and perplexing. What relation exists between one of these activities taken in the inclusive sense (e. g., action understood as one of the three distinct and coordinate expressions of volition and hence embracing thought, technique, and feeling) and the same activity understood in the narrower and more exclusive sense (action, that is, as one of the three moments of intellectual or aesthetic activity)? In the face of such complication the value of the threefold division of voluntary activity, upon which the present argument is based, appears exceedingly doubtful. Con- sider in particular the case of our intellectual activity. As a mode of volition it must contain the moment of action as well as those of thought and feeling. If we adhere to the definition of action previously adopted, we shall understand by it the adaptation of actual conditions, the use of existing agencies, as means or instruments to lead us to desired results. Apparently then we must introduce into the sphere of thought something resembling experiment, involving an appeal through action to existing facts. But if we do this we seem to break down the boundaries between the fields assigned to the three activities, including within the intellectual what we have previously restricted to the technical and aesthetic spheres. Or, suppose, in order to avoid this difficulty, that we broaden our definition of action, permitting it to signify not the employment of actual instruments only, but of any means whatsoever, ideal as well as actual, in the attainment of an end. Then we shall mean by action, when it appears as a factor in intellectual activity, something different from the action we distinguish from intellectual activity in general. In the first case it signifies the adaptation of ideas, in the second the adapta- tion of existing things. But this solution is also fraught with difficulties; it implies the possibility of proceeding with the dis- covery of truth through the organization of ideas, and in inde- pendence of experiment or objective verification. It also suggests the existence of a theoretical sphere, independent and self- sufficient, in separation from the sphere of practice.

As threatening as these difficulties appear to be, a little further reflection serves to dispel them. It is true that the three factors of thought, action, and feeling, appear in each of the main activities in question. But in each case they differ in relative prominence; and it is this, the special manner in which these three constituent factors combine, that is the distinguishing characteristic of the activity-intellectual, technical, or aesthetic. Take the intellectual activity as an instance. The aim of this activity is to assimilate new experiences by fitting them into the organized system of ideas. This assimilation is effected through the instrumentality of certain ideas or principles selected for this use, which are analyzed and recombined in such a way as to provide place for the experience whose explanation is sought. Now these mediating ideas are actually-existing instru- ments in the sense that they have been previously verified in conduct and hence stand as facts. Action is present therefore in the employment of instruments which possess independent actuality, inasmuch as they are not entirely in the control of the agent but have their order and connection fixed by past experi- ence. But it is action of a secondary and derivative sort-not action in its original and primary form in which we utilize objects and agencies at first hand, as not represented but immediately experienced. The business of intellect is to ideate, its concern is with the organization of ideas, although some of these ideas, being verified, stand as facts and serve as actual instruments.

The case is of course reversed when we turn to technical activity, or action proper. Here the aim is to effect such adjust- ment of actual objects and agencies as will contribute to the order and completeness of human life. Into this activity thought enters, and feeling as well. But here thought plays a secondary and subordinate part. The action is intelligently planned; the end is imagined, and the course of action anticipated in idea. Thought in this case, however, is mainly engaged with imagining what the prospective experience will be, i. e., what different sets of conditions, what various sequences of events, may be expected to produce the desired result. (So works the thought of the inventor or politician.) But while the steps in action are in a measure foreseen, the foresight is never complete or certain enough to pre-determine the actual experience. Here we must be willing to venture, to act on faith; for it is the objects and agencies immediately experienced which lead, and determine the result. The interest of action, to repeat, is with the adaptation of actual conditions and agencies, and not with the articulation of ideas, although thought and imagination exert a large influence upon the course of action.

The aesthetic activity seeks to further self-organization through the experience of objects which increase the harmony felt among the contents of personal consciousness. Here too all three factors are present, thought and action as well as feeling. But in this case it is the turn of feeling, relegated to a subordinate place in intellectual and technical spheres, to give character to the whole. Feeling is certainly present in thought and action; but it plays a comparatively unimportant part in each. In thought it results from a conscious recognition of failure or success in solving the problem; in action it is consequent upon the ease or difficulty of transition from one step to another. In the aesthetic activity, however, the case is reversed; feeling comes to the fore, thought and action retreat to the background. To be sure, thought enters into the aesthetic experience: objects must be apperceived to be appreciated. But, in this case, the cognitive relations, the interpretative ideas, mediate no new knowledge directly; they serve to extend the range of feeling, to spread it over a wider and more varied field. Action also has a part in the aesthetic activity; adjustment of actual conditions, particularly as they pertain to perception and bodily attitude, is requisite. Yet the action is such as leads to no definite result other than the accentuation or modulation of feeling.

We are now in a position to draw a conclusion of far-reaching importance in its bearing upon the problem of the criterion of truth. Each of the three ends sought by volition, in the co- ordinate fields of thought, action, and feeling, is, in the measure of its attainment, a gauge of the success of the activity which promotes it, and constitutes, within its own field, a criterion of truth. For thought, as belief or hypothesis, enters into each of these activities. In each the aim of thinking is the same-the extension of the unity of personal life-although it appears in different forms, as the system of ideas, the sequence of actions, the fusion of feelings. All three activities realize this common end through the adaptation of existing conditions, only this element of independent existence appears in the one as established fact, in another as actual event, in a third as subjective condition. It is plain that the truth, the validity, of the guiding hypothesis will in each case be determined by the service which it renders in realizing the controlling aim, under the given conditions. We have therefore three criteria by which our beliefs may be tested, intellectual consistency, technical efficiency, and emotional harmony, each of which is an indication of the bearing of a belief upon the work of self-organization in a special province of personal life.

1. Intellectual Consistency.-When a belief concerns an object or subject-matter that has direct and definite relation to what we already know, it may be judged true or false according as it agrees with, or contradicts, this previous knowledge. The past experience of the race, worked over by our organizing intelligence, has yielded certain fundamental principles whose attested uni- versality expresses the teleological unity for which the human will is ever seeking. Beliefs that are inconsistent with these principles are at once rejected as false, e. g., those that contradict the laws of natural causation, as reports of miracles, wonders, etc., and those which violate the laws of mechanics, as belief in the possibility of perpetual motion, the levitation of bodies, etc. Besides the system of ideas with its fundamental principles and conceptual framework which is imparted to him through the channels of social heredity, the human individual acquires in the course of his experience a stock of ideas which exerts a controlling influence over his beliefs. Particularly in the field of his own trade or profession, does the individual test the ideas that are brought to his attention by their conformity with the facts of his own experience, as these have been systematized in the course of reflection. Indeed, when we consult an expert in any line we do not expect that he will take our case as material for experiment or seize the opportunity it offers to put his untried theories to the test of action, but that out of his encyclopedic knowledge and large experience, he will be able at once to discover the truth about it.

2. Technical Efficiency.-When a belief concerns an object that is, or may be made, an end of immediate action, or a means to some end, in the conduct of life, its truth is tested by its efficiency in guiding us to the desired end. Since, in this field the adjustments sought are of natural forces to human needs, or of individual interests to social welfare, the efficiency in question may be of a mechanical or biological, or of a social or psycho- logical character. This is of course the practical in the narrower sense or, as we have preferred to call it, the technical criterion of truth, to which the pragmatists in recent years have directed our attention, and there can be no doubt of its importance. It is a test constantly applied to our ideas in everyday life. The belief that the 7:I2 train will get me in town early enough for the theater is tested by its efficiency, when acted upon, of bringing the desired result. So it is with countless other beliefs that concern the objects of our environment, natural and social,- that it is beneficial to sleep out-doors the year round, that public morality would be improved by opening the school-buildings for dancing and games in the evenings, that drunkenness would be lessened by the municipal ownership of saloons, etc.

3. Emotional Harmony.-The truth of an idea may be further tested by its ability to arouse a certain kind of pleasant feeling -feeling that may be described as a harmony of pleasures or the pleasure of harmony. It is a feeling which resembles the pleasure that accompanies the realization of an object as end, with the increased organization and strengthened unity of personal con- sciousness which results from such attainment. The relation is closer than that of mere resemblance, however; as the feeling in question undoubtedly owes its existence to the fact that the unity and coherence among the elements of conscious personality are augmented by the belief which arouses it, although just how we are unable to detect or describe. There is also a kinship between this feeling and the feeling of disinterested pleasure which char- acterizes the aesthetic experience and arises when an object is capable of putting the perceptual and intellectual faculties in such free and harmonious play as to induce the pleasure of actual appropriation and intimate union. Now when a belief cannot be verified by its consistency with previous knowledge or attested by its efficiency in action, its power of imparting an added harmony and thus communicating a new significance to the con- tents of consciousness, even though this harmonizing effect be rather felt as a pervasive influence than clearly detected here or there, should be taken as an indication of its truth. In actual fact many beliefs are accepted mainly on this ground. Take for example the belief that a tie of spiritual kinship exists among all men (the brotherhood of man) or that personal life and develop- ment will continue after natural death (the immortality of the soul)-neither of these beliefs can be guaranteed by knowledge we already have, nor verified by any experiment we can at present perform, yet they are widely accepted as true chiefly, it would appear, because of the increased harmony and coherence which we feel they impart to our lives and conduct.

Nor is this criterion limited in its influence to popular thought; it plays a part in scientific inquiry as well. When a scientist has acquired a thorough knowledge of his subject, as the result of years of study and experiment, he has come to think in terms of his field. Hence when a belief or hypothesis harmonizes with such established ways of thinking, he is disposed to accept it as true. The significant thing, of course, is that the agreement is not one discovered by reflection; it is rather signalized by feeling and comes in the guise of immediate intuition. The quality which an hypothesis may have of agreeing with the psychic activities of the expert in the field to which it applies, is made much of by authorities on scientific method like Poincare, who frequently refers to the simplicity, the elegance, the fitness, of a theory as an indication of its truth. [Cf. Poincare, Science and Hypothesis (trans. by Halsted), pp. 94-95 and pp. I05-II3. In answer to the question whether the procedure of science in generalizing upon empirical data is legitimate, he says (p. 94) that if this power were denied to science “it would have no value for us, since it could give no satisfaction to our craving for order and harmony and since it would be at the same time incapable of foreseeing.”]

At this point we are bound to inquire, what is the relation of these criteria to one another? Do we not suffer from an embarrassment of riches in having three criteria of truth and falsity at our disposal instead of one? Has each one its peculiar province, its application being required by the special character of the belief under scrutiny? Or may any one of the three be used at pleasure, each being by itself a conclusive test? Or must a belief be tested by all three criteria taken together in order to be verified completely? Here are three possibilities, and every one of them receives a measure of fulfillment in the verification of our ideas.

A. There are certain conditions which make one criterion and it alone applicable as a test of truth.

The body of established truth which exists at any period of human development is the result of the action of previous generations in realizing objects and satisfying the demand of volition for continued self-realization. If a belief has been verified in the past experience of the race and thus given objectivity, this fact is indicated by its consistency or coherence with the system of recognized truth. When such coherence exists, common-sense and economy of effort demand that we accept it as proof of the truthfulness of the idea, instead of attempting ourselves to verify it by action. On this basis, we are constantly accepting as true, ideas with reference to which we have neither the time to act, nor the facilities to experiment. When I read that animals on Mars, if there be such creatures on that planet, must have more lithe and graceful bodies than they do on the earth because the pull of gravity is less there than here and, consequently, less massive muscles must be developed for purposes of self-support, I accept the assertion as true because it agrees with what I know of the principles of mechanics and physiology. Contrariwise, we must 1 Dr. Cooley, in his Principles of Science (Holt, I9I2), distinguishes four criteria of truth: (I) agreement with established facts; (2) exclusive agreement with fact (together these two seem identical with ‘intellectual consistency’ as given above); (3) experimental verification, the pragmatic test; and (4) immediate or intuitive certainty, due to the direct response, either of approval or of disapproval, which the mind makes to a new idea, according as it agrees or disagrees with the kind of psychic movement to which it has become accustomed (p. 73). He admits that the authority of the criterion last named has frequently been impeached.  6ig as a rule reject as false all beliefs and reports that are inconsistent with, that contradict, our organized experience. When a report is circulated reflecting upon the honesty of a man whose probity and rectitude have been established in my belief by years of acquaintance and intercourse with him, I am justified in at once rejecting the report as false.

In the second class of instances, however, the belief concerns a matter that is practically new in human experience, having never stood the test of conduct. In such case previous knowledge throws no light, and consistency as a criterion is useless. We must then resort to action and experiment, testing the idea in question by its efficiency in leading us to the realization of desired ends. How else shall we test the truth of such beliefs as that ‘the initiative and referendum will secure an expression in law of the general will,’ or that ‘the practice of eugenics will result in social improvement,’ except by putting them in practice, and then observing whether they contribute to economic and social organization.

Finally, when it is impossible to test an idea either by past experience or future action, we seem justified, within certain limits, in accepting the verdict of present feeling, provided this is persistent and unmistakable. At least this is what men always have done and, if it is a mistake, it will prove one hard to correct. In the two instances cited, the ideas of human brotherhood and of personal immortality, both of which are widespread and firmly held in human thought, the grounds of belief are chiefly emo- tional, consist in fact in the added harmony these beliefs are felt to impart to the contents of personal experience. [It is interesting to note that the use of feeling as a ground of belief often precedes rather than follows other methods of attempted verification. On the strength of the feeling that it arouses, a belief like that in human brotherhood is accepted as true, is adopted as an end of action, and, finally, as a consequence of its realization, may be incorporated as a fact in the accepted body of knowledge.] The appeal which classic literature makes to us is largely of this character. We accept the situation and characters of the great epic, drama, or novel, as real, as truthful, mainly because we feel that they fit in with, and assimilate themselves to, what is most fundamental in our experience, what is most imperative in our conduct.

The author first feels the reality of his own conceptions and then through his art, makes it possible for us, by sympathetic imita- tion, to share his experience and feel its truthfulness. It is this emotional criterion, principally, that makes Hamlet, Tito, and Pecksniff, seem truer to human nature than many existing persons.

B. In the case of many ideas, the intellectual, technical, or emotional criterion may be applied at will, and particularly as far as the first two are concerned, with equal advantage. When confronted with an object or situation which I do not understand it is often a mere matter of personal choice whether I ‘think it out’ or investigate it through action and experiment. Hearing a noise upstairs I wonder if it is the window rattling. I may settle the question entirely by thought, remembering that a west window was open, that a few hours ago I saw signs of the wind changing from southeast to west, and that the door open in the hall would create a draught sufficient to rattle the window. Or I might regard it as the simpler thing to ascend the stairs, close the window I found open, and then see if the noise ceased. Such cases are too numerous and familiar to require further illustration.

C. When, for example, a social or political institution which has had a large influence on man’s development, plays a leading part in his existing civilization, and promises to affect momen- tously his future progress, is the subject-matter of thought, the range and importance of the subject may render advisable the use of all three criteria. Thus beliefs which relate to popular government, to marriage and the family, to the judicial system, may require verification by all three methods before they are accepted as true. Most of all is it necessary that beliefs which concern Universal Reality, metaphysical theories that is, should be subjected to all three tests before they are even tentatively accepted as true. To deserve our credence a philosophy should be consistent with the facts of experience as these are systematically recorded in the different sciences, useful as an instrument of adjustment in the economic and social spheres, and harmonizing in its emotional effects.

It is noteworthy that our study of the implications of ‘practical success,’ as the criterion of truth has led us to conclusions that resemble in a general way those of Kant. There is agreement upon this fundamental point-that as legitimate grounds of belief we must admit, in addition to the requirements of intellectual consistency in the organization of the data of experience, the demands of the life of action, and the capacity of certain ideas always to arouse pleasant feeling. [According to Kant the recognition of ,the purposiveness in objects always excites in us pleasure, which is due to harmony between the nature of objects as conceived and our own cognitive faculties. Cf. Kritik of Judgment, translated by Bernard, Introduction, vi.] .The absolute separation of these three spheres which Kant maintains, and particularly his dualism between the theoretical and the practical reason, we have endeavored to avoid by treating the three capacities of thought, action and feeling, as subordinate expressions of the basal activity of will, understood as an agency of self-organization. Consequently, we have been led to interpret action not as the equivalent of conduct or practice (which of course includes both intellect and emotion), but in the narrower sense as the technical capacity, the ability to adapt means to the realization of ends. Now if the question be asked whether our conclusions compel us to agree with Kant in holding that only mechanical formulations of the objective world can be justified on intellectual grounds, while we must look to the spheres of action and of feeling to justify our beliefs in the existence of freedom and purpose in the world, our answer must be partly no and partly yes. Certainly such a voluntarism as has been developed in the foregoing paragraphs, which understands ‘will’ not as a blind striving or an unillumined life-force, but as the power of intelligent self-organization, affords no sufficient reason for doubting the ability of thought to express real development or reach a teleological view of the world. Indeed the goal of thought, the complete organization of ideas, will be reached only when all existing objects are seen to be instrumental to the life of self-conscious personality. And since the ideas to which thought attributes objectivity, and which as facts it must endeavor to correlate, are those which have been realized as ends in conduct, there is nothing to hinder teleology from acquiring intellectual validity, provided that intelligence is able to adapt all existing objects to the promotion of personal life. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the only beliefs which do possess intellectual validity are those which have proved to be means to self-organization, along with their implications, as these have been revealed by the work of thought. Now the ideas that have secured fullest verification in conduct are undoubtedly those of the natural sciences. The mechanical view of the world, with the principles and categories involved, has been proved valid by the control it has given us over the forces of nature, in the conservation and furtherance of our physical well-being. The ends of our social and religious life, those of universal human understanding, cooperation, and sympathy, have in contrast to this, been much less completely attained, and the beliefs which promise to be instrumental in their realization, such as those in the permanence and freedom of personality, have received much less convincing verification. In fact, these principles can scarcely claim validity on purely intellectual grounds as yet, they must at present be regarded as postulates, which are justified on pragmatic and emotional grounds.

HENRY W. WRIGHT